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Abstract 
I find that firms led by female top executives hold more cash, partly due to precautionary motives. To 
overcome endogeneity concerns, I employ several econometric techniques, including an instrumental 
variable analysis based on a historical event that resulted in a plausibly exogenous variation in the female 
workforce participation. Overall, my results are consistent with the view that greater risk-aversion leads 
female executives to hold more cash. 
JEL Classifications: J16, G30 
Keywords: Gender, Corporate cash holding, risk-aversion 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Opler et al. (1999), the study of corporate cash holdings has gained significant attention. One 
of the most important reasons for holding cash is a precautionary motive (Keynes (1936), Opler et al. 
(1999)). Cash provides a cushion against bankruptcy risks and fends off adverse cash flow shocks because 
cash enables firms to finance their activities if other sources of financing are not available. Consistent with 
this view, Bates et al. (2009) find that the increase in firms’ cash holdings over time are positively correlated 
with the increase in firm-specific risks. However, from an investment point of view, cash (and cash 
equivalents) are negative net present value (NPV) projects because interests earned on cash and marketable 
securities are generally much lower than investors’ required rates of return. Because holding cash entails 
such risk-return tradeoffs, it is plausible that managers’ risk-aversion influences how much cash a firm 
holds. 
I examine if risk-tolerances of top executives of public companies influence corporate cash 
holdings. I build on a growing literature which shows that managers’ traits and personal preferences lead 
to heterogeneous policies among otherwise similar firms (see, e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2014), Adhikari and Agrawal (2016a, 
2016b)). Most studies on corporate cash holdings assume that it is a function of firm-specific characteristics 
only. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that managers’ idiosyncrasies may significantly explain why 
some companies hold more cash than others. An interesting example is Steve Jobs. Jobs, who is better-
known for his self-confidence and innovativeness, did not pay dividends and hoarded huge amounts of 
cash, presumably because he was gun-shy from the hardship Apple had endured in the late 1990s.1 So, 
                                                          
1 Fortune reports “When he returned to Apple in 1997 the company was, according to his recollection, three months 
away from bankruptcy. Since then he has treated Apple's growing cash hoard like a starvation survivor treats food in 
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examining the potential role of managerial preferences can significantly add to our knowledge of corporate 
cash holdings.  
I hypothesize that firms led by more risk-averse managers hold more cash due to precautionary 
motives. Executives’ risk-tolerances are largely unobservable, but numerous studies have shown that 
gender is an important predictor of an individual’s risk-tolerance, with women being less risk-tolerant than 
men.2 Even in public companies, female executives pursue less risky corporate policies than their male 
counterparts (see, e.g., Huang and Kisgen (2013), Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016), Adhikari, Agrawal 
and Malm (2016), Zeng and Wang (2016)).3 Accordingly, I use the number of women in a firm’s top 
executive team as a proxy for managers’ aggregate risk-aversion.4 I find that firms with more women in 
their top executive teams hold more cash as a proportion of total assets. Figure 1 presents a snapshot of my 
main findings: the industry-adjusted ratios of cash and cash equivalents to total assets increase with the 
number of female top executives in a firm (0 or 1 or 2, or more than 2). 
Figure 1: Average industry-adjusted cash holding across the number of female top executives 
 
I acknowledge the endogeneity of female representation in the top executive teams and deal with 
this issue in various ways. This includes an instrumental variables technique that uses a novel instrument 
based on an historical event that led to a plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of qualified female 
                                                          
the larder -- something that could disappear at any time. […] Jobs said [when asked] why Apple didn't pay 
dividends, "The cash in the bank gives us tremendous security and flexibility. - Fortune (Aug 13, 2010) 
http://fortune.com/2010/08/13/why-steve-jobs-doesnt-pay-dividends/  
2 See, e.g., Cohn et al. (1975), Riley and Chow (1992), Hinz, McCarthy and Turner (1997), Vanderhei and 
Bajtelsmit (1997), Sunden and Surette (1998), Adhikari and O’Leary (2011). 
3 In general, an individual’s personal behaviors are found to be consistent with their behavior at work. For instance, 
Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2011) find that CEOs who use bigger mortgages for their own house also use more 
leverage in their firms. 
4 Using % of women also obtains very similar results. 
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executives. Further analyses suggest that the effect of female executives on cash is more pronounced among 
firms that are likely to need more cash for precautionary motives.  
2. Data and variables 
My sample comprises the intersection of the Compustat, CRSP and Execucomp datasets. The 
sample starts in 1995 and ends in 2010. Following previous studies, I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4949) because these industries are highly regulated. 
My main dependent variable of interest is a firm’s cash holdings, defined as the natural log of the 
ratio of cash and marketable securities (Compustat: che) to total assets (Compustat: at). My main 
explanatory variable of interest is the number of female executives among the top executives of a firm listed 
in the Execucomp database. Other control variables are similar to those used in prior studies on cash 
holding. Table 1 provides definitions and basic summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. 
Table 1: Definitions and basic summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Cash Holding Natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total 
assets (Compustat items: che/at) 
-2.72 -2.49 1.58 
# Female Execs. Number of female executives among the top executives in a year listed in 
Execucomp database  
0.33 0.00 0.63 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of annual sales (sale) 7.10 7.02 1.59 
Net WorkCap Non cash current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets 
(wcap- che)/at 
0.08 0.07 0.15 
Cash Flow Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation scaled by total 
assets ((ib +dp)/at) 
0.08 0.09 0.12 
Cash Flow Risk Standard deviation of time-series of Cash Flow for a firm 0.07 0.05 0.07 
Tobin's Q Ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets ((prcc_f * csho 
+ at - che)/at) 
2.07 1.60 1.49 
R&D R&D expenditure divided by sales (xrd/sale) 0.06 0.00 0.15 
Acquisitions Acquisitions scaled by total assets (aqc/at) 0.03 0.00 0.06 
CapEx Capital expenditures divided by assets (capx/at) 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Leverage Long-term debt scaled by assets (dltt/at) 0.19 0.16 0.18 
Dividend Payer An indicator variable for non-zero cash dividends (dv) 0.51 1.00 0.50 
 
3. Female executives and cash holding: baseline results 
Table 2 shows the results from the regressions for cash holding decisions. T statistics, robust to 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering, are in parentheses. To reduce the influence of outliers, most 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5%. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% for two-tailed tests are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. Model 1 is a parsimonious model, 
which only controls for industry (Fama-French 48) and year fixed effects and finds that firms with more 
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women in the top executive team hold more cash after accounting for time and industry effects. To minimize 
the omitted variable bias, Model 2 includes a large number of control variables that are also important 
predictors of cash holdings as found by previous literature. Model 2 also obtains a positive and statistically 
highly significant coefficient on # Female Execs. Specifically, the coefficient of 0.075 indicates that 
compared to a firm with no female executives, a firm with one female executive has a 7.5% higher 
cash/asset ratio.  
Table 2: Top female executives and cash holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Cash 
Holding 
Cash 
Holding 
Cash 
Holding 
# Female Execs. 0.134*** 0.075*** 0.090*** 
 (4.37) (3.03) (3.35) 
Firm Size  -0.121*** -0.125*** 
  (-8.02) (-8.46) 
Net WorkCap  -1.717*** -1.926*** 
  (-11.26) (-10.85) 
Cash Flow Risk  2.011*** 1.971*** 
  (6.31) (6.03) 
Tobin's Q  0.168*** 0.154*** 
  (16.27) (14.98) 
R&D  0.882*** 0.774*** 
  (7.15) (6.47) 
Acquisitions  -2.634*** -2.838*** 
  (-15.68) (-14.92) 
Cash Flow  0.995*** 1.003*** 
  (8.53) (8.25) 
CapEx  -3.509*** -3.383*** 
  (-10.02) (-8.95) 
Leverage  -1.799*** -1.633*** 
  (-14.85) (-12.58) 
Dividend Payer  -0.217*** -0.190*** 
  (-5.06) (-3.97) 
Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 21539 19518 14288 
Adj. R2 0.444 0.284 0.462 
There are more female executives in some industries than others. So, one concern is that these 
differences in cash holdings may be an artifact of vast differences in industry practices. I estimate my 
regressions with a sample that excludes three industries, broadly defined, with the greatest representation 
of female executives (Huang and Kisgen (2012)):  consumer durables, consumer non-durables, and 
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manufacturing. The results in column 3 reveal that the effect of female executives on cash holdings 
continues to remain strong even when I exclude the firms with the highest presence of female top 
executives. Therefore, my results are unlikely to be driven by large differences in industry practices.  
4. Identification issues and instrumental variables 
Female representation in top management positions is likely to be endogenous, which makes it 
difficult to interpret my results thus far as a causal relation. First, women, being more risk-averse than men, 
might self-select into firms that have a culture of holding more cash for precautionary purposes. Second, 
observable and unobservable omitted variables might be simultaneously affecting the presence of women 
in the top executive teams and firms’ cash policies. I attempt to overcome such identification issues in the 
following ways. 
4.1 Difference-in-differences 
In this section, I examine a possibility that the positive relation between the presence of female 
executives and cash holdings may be due to a risk-averse firm culture. Such a culture may instill a practice 
of holding more cash and, at the same time, attract more risk-averse employees. If my results are driven by 
a time-invariant firm culture, I should not observe any change in cash holding behaviors within a firm due 
to the changes in top executives. However, if executives’ risk-aversion matters for cash holding, then I 
likely observe changes in cash holding behaviors within a firm, albeit gradually, when there are changes 
from a male to a female executive, or vice-versa. I test these contrasting predictions by using a difference-
in-differences setting around CEO turnovers. However, I realize that the change in cash policy is unlikely 
to be immediate or drastic, but is likely to be gradual. Therefore, I compare the difference in the average 
cash holdings before the CEO turnover with the average of three years after the turnover. 
Table 3: Difference-in-differences around CEO changes 
 (1) (2) 
 Cash Holding Cash Holding 
Post(t+1, t+3) 0.046* 0.038 
 (1.74) (1.43) 
MaleToFemale*Post(t+1, t+3)  0.301*** 
  (2.97) 
FemaleToMale*Post(t+1, t+3)  -0.087 
  (-0.60) 
(Rest similar to Table 1) 
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 Table 3 presents the results. Post(t+1, t+3) is an indicator variable for the window from 1 to 3 years 
after the change in CEO. MaleToFemale indicates that the incoming (outgoing) CEO is a female (male). 
FemaleToMale indicates that the incoming (outgoing) CEO is a male (female). The omitted baseline 
observations are the cases where there is no change in CEO. First, Post(t+1, t+3) obtains a positive coefficient 
which is significant at the 10% level. This suggests that firms increase cash holdings after any CEO 
turnover, possibly because turnover results in a significant uncertainty in the firm, and the new CEO might 
be reluctant to spend cash anywhere yet. More importantly, the regressions obtain a positive and significant 
coefficient on MaleToFemale*Post(t+1, t+3), which suggests that the increase in cash holding after the CEO 
turnover is much higher if the firm replaces a male CEO with a female CEO. This relationship appears 
asymmetric: if a male CEO replaces a female CEO, firms do not decrease cash holdings significantly. 
The difference-in-differences analysis obtains results generally consistent with my baseline results, 
and makes some case for a causal effect. 
4.2 Matched sample 
Another source of endogeneity is the possibility that firms and executives might self-select each 
other according to firms’ business models and executives’ risk preferences. To account for such self-
selection, I employ a propensity score matched (PSM) treatment effect model. I partition my sample into 
two groups: firm-years with and without a woman in the top executive team. Then, using a probit model 
with the full set of control variables used in the regressions in Table 2, I predict the probability of a firm 
having a female top executive. Next, using the nearest neighborhood of the predicted probabilities, for each 
firm that actually has a female top executive (i.e., the treatment sample), I find another firm that does not 
have a female top executive but has almost equal probability of having one (i.e., the matched control 
sample). To ensure the quality of the matches, I impose a caliper of 0.0001 and match with replacement. 
Table 4: Difference in Cash Holding (unmatched and propensity matched samples) 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference T-stat 
Cash Holding Unmatched -2.54 -2.76 0.22*** 8.39 
 ATET -2.55 -2.62 0.07** 2.06 
Table 4 shows the differences in unmatched samples and the average treatment effect of the treated 
(ATET) and finds an ATET of 0.07, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests 
that firms with a female top executive have 7% higher cash ratios than otherwise similar firms without a 
female executive, even after controlling for the possibility of self-selection based on observable firm 
characteristics. 
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4.3 Instrumental variables approach 
To obtain an instrumental variable for the presence of women in a firm’s top executive team, I 
exploit a historical event that led to a plausibly exogenous variation in female labor supplies across different 
states in the US.  My instrument is inspired by Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004), who find that the Second 
World War (WWII) drew many women to the workforce permanently due to a decline in the domestic 
supply of male labor induced by the war. Around 16 million men in the US were mobilized to serve in the 
armed forces. My identification strategy exploits the following two notions:  
1) The mobilization rates varied substantially across US states, partly due to idiosyncratic differences in 
the behavior of local draft boards. Because the negative supply shock of male workers had to be 
compensated with female workers, this variation in the mobilization of men also led to a variation in 
female labor supply across states (Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004)).  
2) The war also changed many men’s perception of working women over subsequent generations because, 
for example, WWII created more men with mothers who worked. Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) 
conclude that “although the effect of World War II faded for the older cohorts, its influence on the labor 
supply for the later cohort persisted” (p. 1278). The war thus created a “ripple” effect that influenced 
not only the generation that was directly affected by the war but also next generations.  
Also, a geographic variation in the supply of capable women for managerial positions is important 
because top executives of public firms are likely to come from local areas (see, e.g. Yonker (2014)). 
Therefore, I expect that the state-level mobilization rate of men in WWII positively predicts female 
representation top management teams of firms in the state. In contrast, perhaps more importantly, there is 
no obvious reason for the state-level mobilization rate to directly affect cash holdings of firms located in 
the state several decades later. So this instrument plausibly satisfies the exclusion criterion. 
Accordingly, I employ the fraction of registered men between the ages of 18 and 44 who were 
drafted or enlisted for WWII in a state (WWII Mobilization) as an instrument for the percentage of female 
executives in the top management team of a firm headquartered in the state, and estimate a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression.5 Column 1 of Table 5 shows the coefficient on WWII Mobilization in a state is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in predicting the number of female top executives in a 
firm headquartered in the state. The range of the mobilization rates across the states is about 10%. Thus, a 
coefficient of 1.601 translates into the difference in the number of female top executives of about 0.16 
                                                          
5 I obtain the list of state mobilization rates from Professor David Autor’s website: 
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/data/autacemly06.  
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(1.601 *10% =0.16)). Thus the economic impact of WWII Mobilization on the number of female executives 
seems substantial considering that the average # Female Execs. is about 0.33.  Column 2 of Table 4 reports 
the results of the second-stage of 2SLS regression, in which Cash Holding is the dependent variable. 
Consistent with my earlier baseline results, the instrumented # Female Execs. positively and significantly 
predicts cash holdings.  
Table 5: Instrumental variables approach 
 (1) (2) 
 
# Female Execs. 
(2SLS – 1st Stage) 
Cash Holding 
(2SLS – 2nd Stage) 
WWII Mobilization 1.599***  
 (4.34)  
# Female Execs. (Instrumented)  2.343*** 
  (3.30) 
(Rest similar to Table 1) 
N 19087 19087 
Adj. R2 0.094 -0.517 
To ensure that the results are not sensitive to the choice of an instrument, in unreported tests I also 
employ another instrument previously used by Huang and Kisgen (2013) based on a state-level gender 
equality index developed by Sugarman and Straus (1988). I obtain similar results as above.6 
5. Precautionary motive of cash holding 
Han and Qiu (2007) show that financially constrained firms are more likely to hold extra cash due 
to precautionary motives because they cannot easily raise capital when needed. If such constraints make 
more risk-averse managers hold more cash, the precautionary motive predicts that the effect of female 
managers on cash holdings should be more pronounced among financially more constrained firms. On the 
other hand, if financial constraint does not moderate the relation between female executives and cash 
holdings, the motive for such cash holding would be ambiguous. To test these predictions, I follow Han 
and Qiu (2007) and use three different metrics for identifying more financially constrained firms: 1) Non-
dividend payers 2) Firms without investment-grade credit ratings, and 3) smaller firms (i.e., firm size less 
than the median firm size). I then estimate my baseline regressions separately among the constrained and 
unconstrained firms. 
                                                          
6 These results are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 6 presents the results. With each measure of financial constraint, I find that the positive 
relation between female executives and cash holdings is more pronounced among more financially 
constrained firms. The predictive power of female executives on cash holding is smaller and mostly 
statistically insignificant among financially unconstrained firms. This result is consistent with the notion 
that uncertainty about the ability to raise cash when needed makes more risk-averse female managers hold 
more cash and supports the precautionary motive of cash holding. 
Table 6: Cash Holdings among constrained and unconstrained firms 
 Cash Holding 
Cash Holding Cash Holding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Non-div. 
Payers 
Div. 
Payers 
Junk or 
unrated 
Investment 
grade 
Small 
firms  
Large 
firms  
# Female Execs. 0.096*** 0.059 0.090*** 0.042 0.080*** 0.059 
 (3.26) (1.55) (3.28) (0.93) (3.28) (0.92) 
(Rest similar to Table 1) 
N 9,826 9,692 14,408 5,110 10,147 9,371 
Adj. R2 0.457 0.363 0.447 0.36 0.367 0.464 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the determinants of corporate cash holdings by 
proposing a behavioral explanation of cash holdings. Using gender as a proxy for risk-aversion, this study 
finds that firms with higher representations of women, who tend to be more risk-averse than men, hold 
more cash. Further analyses, including an instrumental variable approach, suggest that this relation is 
plausibly causal. Higher cash holdings by female executives seems to be motivated by precautionary 
motives.  
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